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Abstract
Excess profits taxes are used to prevent accumulation of monopolistic
rent. We show that current operation of such taxes for property
liability insurance does not, except by coincidence, result in an ex
ante fair return on equity. Derivation of the tax threshold required
to deliver a fair return is illustrated using option pricing and multi-
period capital asset pricing models. This tax creates incentives for
avoidance by reducing the variance of the tax flows and we suggest that
its simultaneous use with direct price regulation results In a system
of "double taxation," which likely will cause deficient returns to con-
stituent insurers.

I. INTRODUCTION
The regulation of prices in industries such as utilities and
insurance is guided by some notion of a fair price. In utility regula-
tory hearings the notion of a fair price is usually linked to that of a
"fair" or competitive rate of return on equity. Historically, the return
on equity concept was not used directly in insurance price regulation
though in those states that require prior approval of insurance premiums
the use of a target rate of return on equity is increasing. Nowhere
is this more evident in states such as Massachusetts and North Carolina
in which courts have upheld the use of the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM).
An alternative method of regulation used to prevent the accumula-
tion of economic rent is to tax abnormally high realized profits. The
surplus above the tax threshold is then returned to consumers in terms
of future price reductions. Such retroactive regulation does not
directly constrain prices; rather it prevents the producer from reaping
a "windfall" return on equity should realized profits exceed some
target level. The tax has the effect of truncating the distribution of
earnings of the firm. The implication is that untaxed earnings will
represent a return to the firm's owners that meets the standards of
acceptability in the regulatory law; e.g., to provide a competitive
rate of return on equity.
Excess profits taxes have been used to prevent windfall profits.
Examples are the use of windfall profits taxes during the Korean War.
Further, extensive debate of such taxes was undertaken during the
Carter Administration in connection with oil companies. Excess profits
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taxes have been used for insurance regulation in several states (e.g.,
Florida, New York, Louisiana, Massachusetts) in some cases supported by
2
specific statutes. Outside the United States, excess profits taxes
3
are used for insurance regulation in West Germany and Japan.
Our concern here is to examine the use of such taxes. Specifically
we will see whether a tax threshold can be established such that the
expected return on equity is "fair" or competitive. We show the deriva-
tion of the "fair" excess profits tax using single period option pricing
model and then by use of a multiperiod asset pricing model. The econo-
mic properties of excess profits tax are discussed in Section V.
Notation
E( ) expectations operator
V pre tax earnings in year t
V value of firm at time t if no EPT is in place
t
V value of firm at time t if subject to EPT
t
J
X incremental risk premium on priced factor M
«M
return on factor M
R risk free rate
I capital investment at time t
t
r expected internal rate of return
k cost of capital after tax
Y* threshold level of earnings for excess profits tax
T rate of corporate income tax (assume constant average rate)
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C(V X) is the price of a European call option on an asset having
terminal value V and striking price X
EPT excess profits tax
II. CURRENT ILLUSTRATIONS OF EXCESS PROFIT TAX
The use of excess profits tax, EPT, may be illustrated with refer-
ence to the New York law. (See Mintel [chapter 11] and Williams [1983b]
for comparisons with other laws.) The following extract from Section
667(5) of the New York State Insurance Law (also quoted by Williams)
captures the general flavor of such laws.
"An excess profit shall be a profit beyond such per-
centage rate of return on net worth attributable to
such policies as is determined by the superintendent
to be so far above a reasonable average profit as to
amount to an excess profit (taking into consideration
the fact that losses or profit below a reasonable
average profit will not be recouped from such policy-
holders) ."
This statement lends itself well to a confidence interval inter-
pretation. For ease of exposition consider that profit Y is normally
2 ~ ~
distributed with known variance a (Y). Realized profit is Y and the
"reasonable average profit," which we interpret to be a "fair" or com-
petitive rate of return, is R. In such circumstances Y is viewed as
not being drawn from a distribution having expected value R and variance
2 -
a (Y) if it exceeds a threshold Y* defined by
Y* = R + Z a(Y)
c
where c is the confidence level at which the statement is made and Z is
the standard normal variate. Selection of an appropriate confidence
level permits the regulator to set the tax threshold at Y*. Such an
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approach was, in fact, selected in New York (New York State Regulation
No. 105 (11 NYCRR 166)) and a similar approach appears to have been
adopted in Florida (Williams [1983b], pp. 452-454).
The implementation of EPT in this manner has several factors of
interest
First, the distributional form and all of its para-
meters except expected value are assumed to be known
in advance.^ Normality is not necessary and other
specific distributional forms can be used or approxi-
mation methods used. For example, the normal power
approximation method permits closer approximations
than the normal when the distribution exhibits
moderate skewness. In this case Y* is selected by
Y* = r + [ Z + i a^(Y)(Z 2 - l)]a(Y)
c 6 3 a
where a~ is a skewness measure.
Second, the confidence interval approach to EPT will
not, in general, lead to profit levels that are
compatible with the predefined profit target. Con-
sider that expected profit is R, the target "fair"
level plus some value K which indicates the level
of monopolistic rent
E(Y) - / Y f(Y)dY = R + K.
—OP
After the tax is imposed at threshold Y* the expected
profit is;
Y*
E(Y') = / Y f(Y)dY + Y*(i-F(Y*))
—00
which, in general, will not equal R. An example will
illustrate the point. Suppose no monopoly rent is
expected, i.e., K = 0. Clearly to achieve a "fair"
expected return, Y* should be set at the maximum
possible value of Y such that the expected burden of
tax is zero. However, the confidence interval re-
quires that Y* be set below the maximum value of Y.
Consequently, with Y* < Max.Y,
E(Y') < R.
Third, an apparent solution to the fair return issue
is to set E(Y') equal to R. However, this approach
ignores the effects of truncation on systematic risk.
Derivation of a fair return solution requires speci-
fication of the appropriate asset pricing model.
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Thus Che E.P.T. is demanding in terms of the required data for
selection of the tax threshold yet it is imprecise in adjusting profits
to the targeted level. Given comparable data input, more direct methods
can be used such that the post tax distribution has an expected value
equal to that targeted on "fair" return principles. This is displayed
in the following sections using alternative asset pricing models.
Whether such approaches are compatible with the statutes is a matter of
judicial interpretation in each particular case. Our purpose is simply
to reconcile the concept of EPT directly with the "fair" rate of return
principle and, in doing so, we illustrate some of the main features of
this tax.
III. SINGLE PERIOD ANALYSIS WITH OPTION PRICING MODEL
The single period model will be used to examine the main features
of such a tax. The advantage of this model is that it permits us to
consider a tax on cash flow and a tax on value as synonymous. This
feature permits valuation of the firm subject to such a tax using the
option pricing model. To further simplify analysis (though this has no
material effect on the insights of this section) we assume an all equity
(no debt) firm.
The excess profit tax (EPT) is defined to truncate the after tax
cash flow of the firm at some value Y*.
if Y : Y*
(1) EPT = {
C L
(Y
c+1
-Y*)(l-T) if Y
c+1
> Y*
Since the model is single period and there is no debt, the after tax
cash flow at t+1 is identical to the firm's value at that time. Thus
the EPT may be considered to be a European call option written on that
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underlying value. The currenc value of Che EPT is the equilibrium
price of such an option
(2) yffM = C(Y*; V ,)EPT,t t-1
The firm subject to such an EPT may be valued as a covered call. Essen-
tially the firm has a long position in the cash flow but has written a
call option with striking price Y*.
(3) V» = V
t
- C(Y*; ? )
The regulatory task is to select the striking price for this option
(Y*) such that V attains some desired level. More specifically, we
will interpret current EPT regulation to imply that V should yield a
"fair" rate of return on equity invested and we consider such a "fair"
return to be that which would prevail in a competitive equilibrium.
The expected rate of return on invested equity after tax is expressed
as some multiple, q, of the cost of capital. The relationship is ex-
pressed in terms of holding period returns.
(l+r)(l-T) = q(l+k)
Multiplying both sides by the value of invested capital I and rearrang-
ing yields
I
or q = ~
t
if I is defined as the replacement cost of employed capital resources,
q is none other than Tobin's "q". If q » 1 the investment I will yield
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a competitive rate of return. With q > 1 monopolistic rates of return
are secured on the investment. Consequently we will interpret the pur-
pose of an EPT regulatory law to be;
(5) select Y* such that V = I
t t
Furthermore, such a tax should only operate if;
(6) V > I
t
Using this criterion and the O.P.M. valuations of equations (2) and
(3), gives the value of the firm as the value of a covered call
(7) V
t
= V
t
" C(Y* ; V = l t
or equivalently, and using (2), (3) and (4)
(8) v
ept,c
e \ - v ; c(Y*= v ( <-i)r t
Either form (7) or (8) might be used to provide an implicit solution
for the tax threshold Y*. Unfortunately, available option pricing
models based on Black and Scholes, do not yield a closed form solution
for the. striking price. Nevertheless the main properties of the tax
are immediately apparent from (8).
(i) If q 1, a fair return is being earned in the absence of the
EPT. Therefore X must be set such that the call has no value,
i.e.
,
Y* > Max(Y
t+1 )
Lower values of Y* are required if q > 1; the relationship
being negative monotonic.
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(ii) It is well known that the value of the call is positively
related to the variance of the underlying stock value. Thus
from (8), the burden of tax will fall differentially on firms
having the same expected rate of return but having differing
variances. Ceteris paribus , firm's will be able to reduce the
burden of E.P.T. by actions that reduce the variance of cash
flows.
The option pricing model is useful for analyzing properties of the
excess profits tax but it does not, in general, provide a solution to
the selection of the tax threshold. In the single period case the end
of period cash flow is identical to the end of period value, therefore
we can treat the tax on earnings as a tax on value. This is not so in
the multiperiod case. The tax specifically is levied on cash flow.
Two other features of the option pricing model may be noted before
moving to a multiperiod model.
(i) the derivation of the EPT threshold did not rest upon any
particular pricing model for the underlying stock. However,
(ii) the use of OPM assumes that the stock value is terminally
distributed as log normal.
We now use a stock valuation approach that assumes normality but, with
simplification, permits a solution of the EPT threshold in a multi period
context.
IV. MULTI PERIOD ANALYSIS WITH STOCK PRICING MODEL
Consider the firm to have a multi period lifespan in which it earns
(before corporate tax) Y in year j. The current period still is t.
Instead of a continuous time asset pricing model (e.g., Merton [1973])
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we use discrete time Co correspond with the discrete periodic imposi-
tion of the EPT. The model used is essentially that of Fama [1977].
(9) V = V <* ) V
t
(Y
c+2 )
+
For simplicity, we proceed with a single factor model and we will assume
the priced factor is the standardized correlation with the market port-
folio, 0. Thus we have a discrete time multi period capital asset
pricing model. Our result can be routinely generalized to a multi fac-
tor model.
ECVjHl-A^jVjA Cl-V . £t+ ._s )
(10) »(? )-i S_i
n (i+Rf ... )
s-0
f
.
c+J"s
where X - Cov(Y
c+
.
; !„ >/E<Y )
£
i
= C°v(e
i
;S
M,i )
e . =
l J l-l J
1 E <*,.+ •>
i-1 C+J
E( # ) is expectation taken at time i
i
Cov( # ) is covariance taken from distributions estimated at time i
i
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We achieve considerable simplification by assuming that the market
risk premium is constant over time, as is the relative covariance of
each cash flow with the coincident return on the priced factor R^. We
further assume that revisions of expectations are uncorrelated with the
return on the priced factor. The risk free rate also is assumed to be
constant over time
X. = X = constant for all 1
J
X. = X = constant for all i
J
e. = for all 1
J
R£ . = R£ for all j
With these simplifications we can combine (9) and (10) to state the
raulti period valuation model. We also include a proportionate income
tax; thus
n E(Y )
(11) V = [(1-XX) E S-J-rKl-T)
j-1 (l+R
f
)
J
For convenience we have dropped the time descriptor from the expec-
tations operator noting that all expectations are taken at time t.
Similarly we will omit the descriptor from the covariance expression.
We now address the imposition of EPT, noting that without the tax,
(*) V
t
= ql
t
The cash flows are now truncated such that the post EPT value is
reduced to
(7) v; = i
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No unique solution exists! There is an infinite number of possible
ways of truncating the future cash flows such that their capitalized
value is reduced by a known value. However, convenient solutions can
be illustrated. For example, consider the case where the distribution
of earning is stationary over all future periods
E(Y ) = E(Y) for all j
The solution is to select a set of values Y* such that 7 is satis-
t+J
fied. An obvious and convenient solution is one in which the tax
threshold is itself constant
Y* = Y* for all i
Imposing a stationary distribution of earnings and truncating
earnings at Y*, (11) transforms to
(12) V^ = {[Eq*(Y) - X CoVq*(Y;R
m
)] E ^-y}(l-T) = I
t
Using the properties of a truncated normal distribution, and noting
that an annuity of $1 in perpetuity at the risk free rate reduces to
1/R
f ,
equation (12) reduces to
(13) V^ = {[E(Y)F(Y*) - a2 (Y)f(Y*) - X Cov(Y; R^FCY*)]
R
f
" r
t
Rearranging and substituting from (11) gives;
(14) V' = F(Y*)V - [a 2 (Y)f(Y*)j ^ = I
t t K._ L
-12-
or, in terras of the "q" ratio, we may substitute from (4) for V
(15) I
t
- [o
2 (Y)f(Y*)(l-T)]/R
f
(qF(Y*)-l) =
Thus we have an implicit solution for Y* in terms of q; the solution
depending on the normal distribution function and the normal density
function both evaluated at Y*. A solution will yield to numerical
analysis. When earnings are expected to grow, a convenient solution is
for the tax threshold to grow at a sympathetic rate. This solution can
be developed along similar lines.
The tax threshold identified with the asset pricing model here
behaves much the same way as that derived with option pricing. Speci-
fically, the threshold required to deliver a fair expected return is
related to the variance of the firm's earnings. We now examine the
behavioral incentives conveyed through this feature.
V. ECONOMIC PROPERTIES OF EXCESS PROFITS TAX
a) On the Incidence of Tax and Tax Avoidance
The burden of E.P.T. ex ante is directly related to the variance of
the firm's cash flows. If the tax threshold is determined uniformly
across all firms in the industry, it will discriminate between firms
according to the variance of pretax earnings. Thus, firms will reduce
8
the ^x ante tax burden by undertaking activities that reduce variance.
Examples of such activities include: reductions in leverage, conglo-
merate merger; selection of low risk projects and hedging activities.
In the case of insurance companies, a specialized form of hedging is
available, notably reinsurance. Since the reinsurance market is well
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developed, this market provides a simple and quick method for stabiliz-
ing the direct insurers earnings. E.P.T. may be expected to increase
reinsurance activity.
A related effect of an industry wide tax threshold is that it dis-
criminates between small and large insurers. Given similar portfolio
composition and low correlations between policies, an insurer writing a
large number of policies will hold a more diversified portfolio than
its smaller counterpart. The lower variability in the former's insur-
ance portfolio will result in a lower prospective tax burden than that
for the small firm.
An alternative to the blanket tax threshold is to fit the threshold
to the estimated density function of earnings for the individual firm.
Thus, given equality of expected earnings, the firm with higher variance
in earnings would have a higher tax threshold than the firm with more
stable earnings. If the tax is declared at the beginning of the year,
the firm then has an incentive to change the risk profile of its earn-
ings distribution. This "moral hazard" problem would result in exces-
sive reinsurance or similar risk reducing activity in similar fashion
to the case where the tax is determined at the industry level. The
severity of this problem will depend upon the degree of ex post
"settling up." For example, if the regulatory authority calculates
the earnings distribution on the basis of historical earnings, any risk
reducing actions adopted by the firm after the announcement of the tax
in year "t" will simply serve to reduce the estimated variance in the
probability distribution for year "t+1." Consequently, the tax thres-
hold would be lowered for the subsequent year. This issue is identical
-14-
to that of moral hazard in insurance contracts in which premiums are
experience rated. (See Rubinstein and Yaari.)
The "variance effect" has other implications. In the absence of
high serial correlation, the mean earnings over a number of consecutive
years will tend to exhibit lower relative variance than the earnings
for any single year. Thus, a tax levied on the average earnings over
several years will provide fewer opportunities for the above tax avoid-
9
ing strategies than a tax levied on the earnings of a single year.
Both the New York, and Florida systems do adopt a multi year "moving
average" approach though apparently this solution was achieved through
slightly different reasoning; namely to improve the confidence interval
on the statement that "earnings exceeding the threshold are not drawn
from a distribution having the target return as its mean."
Finally, the incentive to reduce the variance of earnings rein-
forces another objective of the insurance regulatory authorities. In
addition to concern for a fair price, regulators also aim to contain
the probability of bankruptcy (or "ruin") to some acceptable level.
For any given portfolio composition and capital structure, the ruin
probability will be positively related to the variance of its earnings.
Thus, E.P.T. complements regulatory restrictions on leverage (in
insurance leverage typically is measured by the ratio of premiums to
surplus) and similar solvency controls.
b) Dual Regulation and Double Taxation
In states such as New York and Florida, E.P.T. supplements an
existing regulatory vehicle that aims at achieving fair prices. In
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each of these states, automobile insurance rates can only be implemented
with the prior approval of the insurance commissioner who therefore has
a direct control of prices. We now examine briefly the combined inci-
dence of a dual regulatory system.
We assume, for the time being, that regulators correctly identify
the behavioral model that describes expected equilibrium returns
required by investors and that there is consensus between regulators
and investors in their estimation of each firm's earnings distribution.
If the regulator sets price such that the expected return on equity is
equal to the required return, the regulatory target will be met, econo-
mic rent will not accrue ex ante , and the "q" value of the firm should
equal unity. The realized profit may turn out to be higher or lower
than the expected level but this uncertainty is known at the time rates
are set and may (for example, if the risk is systematic) be priced into
the required rate of return. The introduction of an EPT (which is not
empty in the sense that its expected burden is positive) will reduce
expected return below the level considered appropriate for direct price
regulation. This "double taxation," will result in loss of equity
value causing the "q" ratio to dip below unity.
Now drop the assumption of a shared asset pricing model and homo-
geneous expectations. It follows that E.P.T. can now be used to correct
either for misspecif ication of the asset pricing model used in direct
pricing regulation or for the regulator's inability to replicate the
earnings distribution estimated by investors at the time prices were
regulated. Both roles appear rather trivial: a more obvious solution
to such problems is to reform the system of direct price regulation.
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Then the supplementary use of prior approval would appear to be expli-
cable only on the principle that "two wrongs make a right." This rea-
soning does not imply that EPT will be inappropriate as a substitute
for direct price regulation.
Summary
Excess profits taxes currently are used in conjunction with direct
price regulation for property-liability insurance. The current forms
adopted in states such as New York and Florida, do not provide a tax
burden compatible with the fair or competitive expected rate of return.
We demonstrate a fair return solution to EPT using both the option
pricing model and a simplified multi period capital asset pricing model.
E.P.T. can be partially avoided if the firm reduces the variance of
its earnings following the setting of the tax threshold. The potential
for such avoidance is reduced both by ex post "settling up" and by im-
posing tax on a multi period basis. We also show that the simultaneous
use of EPT and direct price regulation is inconsistent with the fair
return target if direct regulation is properly conceived and implemented,
EPT is more properly viewed as an alternative for, not a complement to,
direct price regulation.
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Footnotes
1
^See Mintel [1983] Chapt. 13, Williams [1983b].
See J. K. Mintel [1983] Chapt. 11; Hill [1979] and Fairley [1979].
2.
See Williams [1983a].
4
The firm might announce the tax threshold at the end of the tax
period rather than at the beginning. However, it is difficult to see
what: is gained from this delay. True, another observation of actual
earnings will be to hand, i.e., that for the tax year. However, the
issue is whether this realized value is taken from a distribution having
an expected value R and variance a^(Y). Since we are using the sta-
tistical test to answer this question, we cannot use the realized profit
to estimate the parameters of the distribution.
ou(Y) in the third moment about the mean standardized by the cube
of the standard deviation. For exposition of this method see Beard
et al [1968].
See Winkler, Roodman and Britney [1972]. For applications using
the capital asset pricing model see Lintner [1977].
To see the effect of changes in variance on the tax threshold yet
we may use the implicit function theorem on equation (14)
Z = F(Y*)V - a2 (Y) f (Y*) —£. -1 =
t R
f
dY* 9Z/3a [(l-T)/Rf ]f(Y*)
da 3Z/3Y*
v f(Y*) - a
2 (Y) [(1-T)/R
f
]
f
•
(Y*)
From the normal distribution,
f(Y*) = - [Y
*"E(Y) ]f(Y*)
a (Y)
Substituting, we find dY*/da to be positive over the range
R
f
Y* > E(Y) - V
t -j-|
Which is, in fact, most of the range of the distribution. EPT is
likely to be adopted when excess profits are the exception rather than
the rule, indeed the language of the New York Statute implies this to
be Che case. Consequently, we are most interested in value of Y* above
E(Y). Thus, for practical purposes, we assume that the above condition
is satisfied and that the tax threshold increases with the variance of
the firm's earnings.
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Q
This motivation for hedging is similar to Chat addressed by Smith
and Stultz (1984) in connection with Federal corporate taxation. Using
Jensen's inequality they make the point that a concave tax schedule will
induce hedging. Concavity in the Federal tax code arises both from the
progressivity in marginal rates and from the effects of tax shields and
tax credits.
9Notice that this feature is similar to the carry back-carry forward
features in the Federal Tax Code. See Smith and Stultz for hedging
incentives under carry back-carry forward provisions.
The issue is not whether a better estimate of realized earnings
is achieved at the time EPT is set. If we divide time into discrete
periods with all contracts lasting one period, the value of equity at
the beginning of the period will be determined by expectations held by
investors at the beginning of the period. It is the expectation held
at this time, not the subsequent realization of profit, that motivates
capital decisions.
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